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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OVER THIS CASE 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Sections 78-2-2(3)0) and 2(4). 
STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
None applicable to Wallace. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wallace adopts 
by reference the Statement of the Case in Appellee Parkside's Brief, to the extent it is not 
inconsistent with the following: 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
In February 1997, Insure-Rite negotiated a lease agreement ("Lease") with 
Parkside Salt Lake Corporation ("Parkside") to rent office space in the Parkside Tower, 
located at 215 South State ("Leased Premises"). R. 16-17. Collin Perkins, a licensed real 
estate agent of Wallace Associates, a licensed real estate broker acted on behalf of 
Parkside in negotiating the lease provisions. 
The Lease was for fourteen months, but allowed a renewal option ("Renewal 
Option") for an additional three years. R. 694. Wallace, acting on behalf of Parkside, 
offered to renew the lease to Insure-Rite, under the terms provided in the Lease and 
Renewal Option. When Insure-Rite refused to strictly comply with the terms of the 
Renewal Option, Insure-Rite failed to renew the Lease, causing it to become null and 
void. Nevertheless, Insure-Rite failed to vacate the Leased Premises. 
On July 15, 1998, Parkside filed a Complaint against Insure-Rite alleging unlawful 
detainer. Eventually, Insure-Rite answered the Complaint, filed a Counterclaim and filed 
a Third Party Complaint against Wallace. In the interim, however, Parkside moved for 
summary judgment against Insure-Rite. In its motion, Parkside raised the following 
issues: (a) that Insure-Rite failed to exercise the Renewal Option in strict compliance 
with the terms of the Lease; (b) that as a result of this failure, the Renewal Option was 
null and void; (c) that because the Renewal Option was null and void, Insure-Rite was in 
unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises; and (d) that any loss of Insure-Rite was due to 
its failure to exercise the Renewal Option in strict compliance with the Lease. 
On November 13, 1998, the Third District Court, Judge Henriod presiding, (the 
'Trial Court") heard oral arguments on these issues. On November 30, 1998, after 
having reviewed both Parkside's and Insure-Rite's briefs, and having heard oral 
arguments, the Trial Court granted Parkside's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the 
"November 30th Order"). Specifically the Trial Court held that, as a matter of law, 
Insure-Rite failed to exercise its renewal option under the Lease in strict accordance with 
the terms of the Lease and that it was in unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises. R. 
796-99. 
On November 19, 1998, Wallace was served with Insure-Rite's Answer, 
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. Insure-Rite asserted several third party claims 
against Wallace. Wallace filed a Motion to Dismiss Insure-Rite's Third Party Complaint 
based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. Specifically, Wallace 
argued that the November 30th Order addressed and decided the issues raised by Insure-
Rite's Third Party Complaint and thus, collateral estoppel or issue preclusion barred the 
Third Party Complaint 
Wallace's motion was fully briefed by all parties. On November 2, 1999, after 
reviewing the parties' briefs and hearing oral argument, the Trial Court granted Wallace's 
Motion to Dismiss. R. 1368-69. Specifically, the Trial Court found that issue preclusion 
barred Insure-Rite's Third Party Complaint against Wallace. Id. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Parkside leased the Leased Premises to Insure-Rite under a written Lease 
Agreement dated February 18, 1997. R. 627-28, f 9. 
2. The term of the Lease was fourteen (14) months, and the Lease expired on 
June 30, 1998. R. 628, <I 10. 
3. Under the Lease, Insure-Rite possessed an option to extend the term of the 
Lease for an additional three (3) years. R. 694; 628,511. 
4. To exercise its Renewal Option, the Lease required Insure-Rite to provide 
written notice of its intent to extend the Lease prior to March 1, 1998. Within thirty (30) 
days of its receipt of such notice, Parkside was required to inform Insure-Rite of the new 
rental rate for the extended lease term, which was to be set at a "market rate" determined 
by Parkside under provisions in the Lease. Following its receipt of the market rate from 
Parkside, Insure-Rite was required to accept or reject the rate within thirty (30) days. If 
Insure-Rite rejected the market rate within the thirty-day period, its exercise of the 
Renewal Option became null and void. R. 628-29, ffl 12-15. 
5. By a memorandum dated February 6, 1998, Insure-Rite notified Parkside of 
its intent to exercise its option to extend the Lease. R. 628, f 14. 
6. On February 11, 1998, the Defendants provided a lease renewal proposal to 
Insure-Rite on behalf of Parkside. This proposal included a rental rate of $18.00 per 
square foot for the extended term under the Renewal Option, which, as required by the 
terms of the Renewal Option, was based on the average effective market rate. R. 413-16. 
7. By correspondence, on or about March 5, 1998, Insure-Rite rejected the 
market rate included in the February 11, 1998 proposal. Insure-Rite claimed the rate 
should be lower. R. 418. 
8. By letter dated March 16, 1998, Defendant Wallace Associates, on behalf 
of Parkside, once again informed Insure-Rite of the market rate for the extended term 
under the Renewal Option. R. 420-23; R. 629-30, f 17. 
9. On March 25, 1998, Insure-Rite, through its attorney, rejected once again 
the market rate as offered by Wallace. R. 425-27. 
10. Pursuant to the express terms of the Renewal Option, Insure-Rite's 
Renewal Option became null and void upon its rejection of the market rate. R. 694. 
11. By letter dated April 27, 1998, Parkside informed Insure-Rite of its 
obligation to vacate the Leased Premises by June 30, 1998. R. 429-30. 
12. Insure-Rite failed to vacate the Leased Premises by the expiration of the 
lease term, June 30, 1998. R. 617. 
13. On July 15, 1998, Parkside filed a Complaint against Insure-Rite, alleging 
unlawful detainer. R. 1-73. 
14. On or about August 19, 1998, Parkside filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment against Insure-Rite. Parkside's Motion asserted that Insure-Rite was guilty of 
unlawful detainer and that Insure-Rite's Renewal Option was null and void due to its 
failure to accept the market rate proposed by Parkside, through its agents, Wallace. 
Insure-Rite opposed Parkside's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 137-39; R. 146-228. 
16. On November 10, 1998, Insure-Rite filed an Answer to Parkside's 
Complaint, as well as a Counterclaim. In the same pleading, Insure-Rite also filed a 
Third Party Complaint against Wallace. Insure-Rite did not serve Wallace with its Third 
Party Complaint until November 19, 1998. R. 612-707. 
17. On November 13, 1998, the Trial Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, 
presiding, heard oral arguments on Parkside's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Nick J. Colessides, Esq., and John T. Giannopoulos, Esq., represented Insure-Rite at this 
hearing. R. 1479; R. 796-99. 
18. On November 30, 1998, after hearing oral arguments and reviewing the 
legal memoranda in support of and in opposition to Parkside's Motion, the Trial Court 
granted Parkside's Motion. R. 796-99. 
19. The Trial Court specifically found, as a mater of law and without limitation 
that Insure-Rite "failed to exercise its renewal option under the lease between the parties 
[Parkside and Insure-Rite] in strict accordance with the terms of the lease. The Court 
further finds as a matter of law that [Insure-Rite] is therefore in unlawful detainer of the 
premises leased from Plaintiff." R. 797. 
20. By its Order, the Trial Court issued a final determination on all of 
Parkside's causes of action. This Court determined that Parkside was entitled to damages 
including, back-rent, interest, attorney's fees and costs and other damage enhancements 
to be determined at a later date. R. 797. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court correctly held that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred Insure-
Rite's Third Party Complaint against Wallace. The Trial Court correctly found that: 
(1) the issues raised and decided by the Trial Court in Parkside's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and the November 30th Order were essential and 
identical to those raised by Insure-Rite's third party claims; 
(2) the November 30th Order constituted a final judgment for purposes of collateral 
estoppel; 
(3) the issues relating to Parkside's summary judgment motion and the November 
30th Order were fully and fairly litigated; and 
(4) Insure-Rite was a party to the November 30th Order. 
Each of the necessary elements of issue preclusion was found by the Trial Court. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court did not err when it found that the doctrine of issue 
preclusion barred Insure-Rite's third party claims against Wallace. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wallace adopts 
by reference the Argument in Appellee Parkside's Brief, to the extent it is not 
inconsistent with Wallace's argument that Insure-Rite's Third Party Complaint against 
Wallace was properly dismissed because it was barred by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel and therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Held That Insure-Rite's Third Party 
Complaint Against Wallace Was Barred By Collateral Estoppel 
This Court, in Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 247-48 (1987), explained that 
"collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues that have been 
once litigated and determined in another action even though the claims for relief in the 
two actions may be different." Utah courts have repeatedly emphasized that this doctrine 
should be enforced in order to foster reliance on prior adjudications, prevent inconsistent 
decisions, relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, and conserve 
judicial resources. See e.g., Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
For issue preclusion to apply, four requirements must be met: 
(1) the issue decided in the case at hand is identical to the issue 
decided in the previous action; 
(2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits; 
(3) the issue in the previous action must have been competently, 
fully, and fairly litigated; and 
(4) the opposing party in the action at hand must have been either 
a party or privy to the previous action. 
Sevy .v Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995); Murdoch v. Springville 
Municipal Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 70 <][18 (Utah 1999). Because each of these elements were 
met in this case, the Trial Court correctly held that issue preclusion barred Insure-Rite's 
Third Party Complaint. 
A. The Issues Decided By The November 30th Order Were The Same Underlying 
Issues Raised In Insure-Rite's Third Party Complaint Against Wallace. 
The first element of issue preclusion requires that "the factual issue decided in the 
prior action be the same factual issue presented in the second action." Berry, 738 P.2d at 
248. In determining what the factual issue is, "what is critical is whether the issue that 
was actually litigated in the first suit was essential to resolution of that suit and is the 
same factual issue as that raised in the second suit." Id. See also, Sevy v. Security Title 
Co., 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995) (holding issue preclusion bars suit where issues 
presented in first case were "essentially the same" as issues presented in second case). 
A court resolves an issue by making findings of fact or a ruling on a matter of law. 
In short, if the Trial Court correctly held that Insure-Rite's causes of action against 
Wallace raised those issues that were essential and identical to the issues raised and 
decided in Parkside's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the November 30th 
Order, then Insure-Rite's claims against Wallace were barred by issue preclusion. An 
analysis of the issues raised in Insure-Rite's Third Party Complaint, including its claims 
for fraud, intentional interference of economic relations, conspiracy and violation of the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, illustrates that the Trial Court correctly determined 
that the issues were identical and essential to those presented and decided in Parkside's 
Motion and the November 30th Order. 
1. Fraud 
Insure-Rite alleged that Wallace fraudulently induced Insure-Rite into the Lease 
by promising to renew the Lease under the Lease terms. The central issue of this 
allegation was the assertion that Wallace somehow failed to abide by the terms of the 
Lease when negotiating its renewal. Any claim by Insure-Rite that the November 30 
Order was limited only to possession, and that issues involving the Lease terms and the 
parties' exercise of those terms were neither essential to, nor raised by Parkside's motion 
and the November 30th Order, is contradicted by Insure-Rite's own pleadings and logic. 
1
 Insure-Rite relies upon Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1993) for the 
proposition that issue preclusion does not apply to third party claims unless they were 
necessary to the ruling on summary judgment." The cite to Dewsnup, however, does not 
involve issue preclusion and fails to support Insure-Rite's argument. The Dewsnup Court 
merely addressed plaintiffs argument that a final adjudication had been reached on 
defendant's counterclaims during plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Utah 
Court stated "[plaintiff's] contention requires us to examine what issues were raised by 
the counterclaim and what issues were resolved by the summary judgment." Id. at 1182. 
In fact, the Dewsnup Court held that at least one issue raised by the counterclaim had 
First, in Insure-Rite's Opposition to Parkside's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Insure-Rite advanced as a defense the allegation that Wallace and Parkside 
failed to abide by the Lease terms and that their conduct was misleading. See R. 722-28 
(alleging Parkside and Wallace failed to strictly comply with the terms of the option); Id. 
(claiming that Parkside's and Wallace's proposals and conduct were misleading). 
Therefore, by its own actions and defenses, Insure-Rite forced the Trial Court to address 
and determine the Lease terms and whether Insure-Rite and or Parkside violated those 
terms. By its own defenses and arguments, Insure-Rite required the Trial Court to look 
beyond mere possession and to decide the appropriateness of the parties' actions. 
Second, the issue of possessory rights could not have been decided in isolation. 
All of Insure-Rite's third party claims were premised upon the theory that Wallace's 
conduct in determining and presenting the option terms to Insure-Rite was somehow 
wrongful. However, in the November 30th Order, the Trial Court found that Insure-Rite 
failed to properly exercise its renewal option. The Trial Court rejected Insure-Rite's 
contention that Wallace and Parkside violated the Lease terms and found that it was 
Insure-Rite who failed to comply strictly with the terms of the Lease. R. 797. The Trial 
Court could not have reached this conclusion without disposing of the precise issues 
been ruled upon in the Plaintiff's summary judgment motion and therefore a final 
adjudication had in fact been issued. See also, Murdoch, 982 P.2d at 70, f 19 (applying 
issue preclusion where one issue in prior judgment was identical to current issue). 
raised by Insure-Rite in its fraud claim, i.e., that Parkside's and Wallace's conduct was 
somehow wrongful and in violation of the Lease. 
The underlying issue of Insure-Rite's fraud claim rested upon the same facts, 
transactions, and issues decided by the Trial Court in the November 30th Order. 
Consequently, the central issue of Insure-Rite's fraud claim against Wallace - that 
Wallace somehow failed to abide by the terms of the Lease when negotiating the renewal 
- was raised and addressed by the Trial Court. Therefore, the Trial Court correctly found 
that the first element of issue preclusion was satisfied as to the claim of fraud. 
2. Intentional Interference with Economic Relations 
Insure-Rite's second claim against Wallace alleged intentional interference with 
economic relations. Again, the Trial Court correctly held that this cause of action raised 
the same issues presented in Parkside's summary judgment motion and decided by the 
November 30th Order. Insure-Rite admitted as much in its Third-Party Complaint when 
the essential allegation of this claim stated that Wallace interfered in Insure-Rite's 
economic relations by "bringing an Unlawful Detainer action." R. 639-40, f 65. The 
November 30th Order stated that Insure-Rite was "in unlawful detainer of the premises 
leased from Plaintiff." R. 797. Thus, the Trial Court ruled that the unlawful detainer 
action was appropriate, that Insure-Rite was in unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises, 
failed to exercise its option and was required to compensate Parkside for the back rent. 
In short, Insure-Rite's intentional interference claim rested upon the identical issue 
that the Trial Court decided in the November 30th Order. Accordingly, the Trial Court 
correctly found that the November 30th Order barred Insure-Rite's intentional interference 
cause of action against Wallace. 
3. Conspiracy 
Insure-Rite's third cause of action, conspiracy, raised the same issues addressed in 
the November 30th Order. Insure-Rite claimed that Wallace, in conjunction with 
Parkside, acted to "deprive [Insure-Rite] of its right to exercise the Renewal Option and 
to occupy the Leased Premises pursuant to the terms of the Lease." R. 641, f 70. In its 
November 30th Order, however, the Trial Court examined this issue and determined that 
Insure-Rite failed to exercise the Renewal Option in strict compliance with the Lease. 
This failure on the part of Insure-Rite voided the Renewal Lease, not any action on the 
part of Wallace.2 
As with the other claims, the Trial Court addressed in its November 30th Order the 
identical issues to those raised by the conspiracy claim. Accordingly, the Trial Court 
was correct to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion. 
2
 Additionally, accepting Insure-Rite's allegation that Wallace was an agent of Parkside, requires 
that Insure-Rite's claim fails. In simple terms, there can be no conspiracy between a principal 
and its agent. See Buckner v. Atlantic Plant Maintenance, 694 N.E.2d 565, 571 (111. 1998). 
4. Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act 
Finally, Insure-Rite alleged that Wallace violated the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act by supplying false information in order to "force [Insure-Rite] to vacate the 
Leased Premises." Insure-Rite alleged that it was Wallace's actions that forced Insure-
Rite to leave the premises. Insure-Rite's central assertion is that Wallace supplied "false, 
misleading, and fraudulent 'prevailing market rates'" to Insure-Rite and thereby forced it 
to vacate the Leased Premises. R. 642-43, f79. This claim presents two issues that were 
both decided by the Trial Court in the November 30th Order. 
First, the Trial Court determined that the "market rate" as supplied was 
appropriate and was in accordance with the Lease terms. In fact, the Trial Court so ruled 
twice. The first ruling occurred at the hearing on Parkside's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment when the Court stated, "There is no question in my mind but $18 [market rate 
as quoted by Parkside and Wallace] falls within the fair range that we are talking about." 
R. 1479, Transcript of Hearing on Parkside's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at 
page 16, lines 3-4. The Trial Court essentially reaffirmed this ruling when it awarded 
damages for back rent based upon a market rate of approximately the same value as 
initially quoted by Wallace. R. 1184-85. Thus, the Trial Court addressed the issue 
central to this claim -prevailing market rates. 
The Trial Court also decided the second issue central to this claim. Insure-Rite 
argued that it was the conduct of Wallace that "force[dj" Insure-Rite to vacate the Leased 
Premises. Yet, the Trial Court, in its November 30th Order, held that it was Insure-Rite's 
failure to comply with the terms that "force[dj" it to vacate. R. 797. As determined by 
this Court, Insure-Rite's actions caused it to vacate, not the actions of Wallace. 
In conclusion, each of Insure-Rite's causes of actions against Wallace were 
dependent upon a determination of the same issues addressed and decided in the 
November 30th Order, i.e., Insure-Rite's failure to strictly comply with the Lease terms 
rendered its Renewal Option null and void and left Insure-Rite in unlawful detainer of the 
Leased Premises. Because these issues were necessary and identical to those previously 
examined, the Trial Court correctly held that the first requirement for issue preclusion 
was met. 
B. The November 30th Order Constitutes A Final Adjudication On The Merits. 
Regarding the second element of issue preclusion, the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated that "[a] judgment or order is final for purposes of collateral estoppel until reversed 
on appeal, modified, or set aside in the court of rendition." Berry, 738 P.2d at 249. See 
also, Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227, 231 n.9 (Utah 1992). Based upon this 
holding, a judgment need not be final for appellate purposes in order to be final for 
collateral estoppel purposes. 
In this case, the Trial Court issued its order of judgment regarding Parkside's 
summary judgment motion on November 30, 1998. R. 796-99. This Order has not been 
modified and it has not been set aside. Thus, until the November 30th Order is reversed on 
appeal or modified or set aside by the Trial Court, it is final for purposes of issue 
preclusion. Therefore, the Triai Court correctly held that the November 30th Order 
constituted a final judgment. Hence, the second requirement of issue preclusion was 
satisfied. 
C The Issues Were Fully And Fairly Litigated 
The third element of issue preclusion is based on the notion that the parties are 
entitled to procedural due process, or reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Berry, 738 P.2d at 249. Insure-Rite was timely notified of Parkside's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R. 137-139. Insure-Rite filed an Opposition to Parkside's Motion. 
R. 708-28A. The Trial Court heard oral arguments by Insure-Rite ?s counsel in opposition 
to Parkside's Motion. R. 796; R. 1479. 
The Trial Court did not reach its November 30th Order until after carefully 
reviewing the legal memoranda provided by Insure-Rite and after hearing oral argument 
made by Insure-Rite's counsel. R. 796. Moreover, the Trial Court reached its decision 
based upon the merits of the case and not upon a procedural issue. R. 796. Thus, Insure-
Rite was represented by competent counsel and given a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate. Having done so, the Trial Court correctly held that the third element of issue 
preclusion was satisfied. 
D. Insure-Rite Was A Party To The November 30th Order, 
The Trial Court correctly held that the final prong of issue preclusion was also 
met. It is undisputed that Insure-Rite was a party to Parkside's summary judgment 
motion and the November 30th Order. Although, Wallace was not a party, it was not 
required to be. The Utah Court of Appeals held that "it [is] not necessary that the parties 
who assert collateral estoppel against one who lost the issue in a prior case were also 
parties in the first action." Berry, 738 P.2d at 249. Because Insure-Rite was a party to 
the previous action, the final element of issue preclusion was met. 
In conclusion, the Trial Court correctly recognized and ruled that Insure-Rite's 
claims against Wallace were barred by issue preclusion because all four of the 
requirements outlined by the Utah Supreme Court were satisfied. First, the issues raised 
in Insure-Rite's Third Party Complaint against Wallace were identical to those issues 
previously decided by the Trial Court in Parkside's motion and the November 30th Order. 
Second, the November 30th Order constituted a final adjudication on the merits. Third, 
the issues in the November 30th Order were fully and fairly litigated. Finally, Insure-Rite 
was a party to the November 30th Order. 
Accordingly, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, the Trial Court correctly 
barred Insure-Rite from relitigating those issues previously decided by the Trial Court, 
including all of Insure-Rite's causes of actions against Wallace. Therefore, Wallace asks 
this Court to deny Insure-Rite's appeal and affirm the Trial Court's grant of Wallace's 
Motion to Dismiss Insure-Rite's Third-Party Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court did not err as a matter of law in 
determining that Insure-Rite's Third Party Complaint against Wallace was barred by the 
doctrine of issue preclusion. 
DATED this 11th day of January, 2001. 
J/6hn E.S. Robson 
David Pearce 
Fabian & Clendenin, 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants Collin Perkins and 
Wallace Associates 
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and to be served via first class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing, to: 
Nick J. Colessides, Esq. 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3325 
Attorney for Insure-Rite 
John Marinez 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Telephone: (801) 582-1386 
Attorney for Insure-Rite 
Matthew N. Evans, Esq. 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Parkside Salt Lake 
Corp. . 
f 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1: Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Order 
of Restitution (R. 796-99) 
Exhibit 2: Order Granting Parkside Salt Lake Corporation's Motion to Dismiss or 
Alternatively for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Wallace & Associates' 
and Colin Perkins' Motion to Dismiss (R. 1368-69) 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 11 •• 
Robert L Stolcbargcr, #3123 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N. Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE ) 
CORPORATION, a Dclawaic ) 
coiporation, ) 
) 
) 
V. 
Plaintiff, 
INSURE-RITIZ, INC , a Utah corporation. 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION 
Civi l No 980906982 
Judge Stephen L. Hennod 
On Friday, Novembei 13, 1998, this Court, the Honorable Stephen L Hennod presiding, 
heard otal argument on Plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff was represented by 
Matthew N \l\dns of Holme Roberts £L Owen I 1 P Defendant was represented by Nick J 
Coiessides and John I Giannopoulos I he I ouit, ha\ mg considered the legal memoranda in 
support ol MK\ m opposition to the Motion lor Partial Summary Judgment as well as oral 
argument on the same, and good cause appearing, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES: 
L Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted based on the reasons 
set forth in Plaintiffs supporting memorandum. The Court specifically finds as a matter of law 
and without limitation that Defendant failed to exercise its renewal option under the lease 
between the parties in strict accordance with the terms of the lease. The Court further finds as a 
matter of law that Defendant is therefoie m unlawful detainer of the premises leased from 
Plaintiff 
2. Defendant shall forthwith vacate the leased premises, remove its personal 
property, and restore possession of the premises to Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to do so within 
three (3) business days, Defendant shall be forcibly removed from the premises by a sheriff or 
constable. 
3. The amount of damages to which Plaintiff is entitled, including without limitation 
back-rent, interest, attorney's fees and costs and appropriate damage enhancements pursuant to 
i 
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Utah Code. Ann. § 78-36-10 and other applicable law, is reserved for future determination by the 
Court. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Nick J. Colessides 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF RESTITUTION this day of November, 1998, to the 
following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
John T. Giannopoulos 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303 
4 
HWlilf 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 11 p 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N. Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 
?arks;de Salt Lake Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. ] 
INSURE-RITE, INC., ) 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER GRANTING PARKSIDE 
) SALT LAKE CORPORATION'S 
) MOTION TO DISMISS/OR 
) ALTERNATIVELY FOR JUDGMENT 
| ON THE PLEADINGS, AND 
) WALLACE & ASSOCIATES' AND 
1 COLIN PERKINS' MOTION TO 
1 DISMISS 
Civil No 980906982 
Judge Stephen L. Hennod 
On Friday, October 1, 1999, this Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Hennod presiding, 
heard oral argument on Parkside Salt Lake Corporation's ("Parkside") Motion to Dismiss or 
Alternatively For Judgment on the Pleadings and third-party defendants Wallace & Associates1 
("Wallace") and Collin Perkins' ("Perkins") Motion to Dismiss. Parkside was represented by 
Matthew N. Evans of Holme Roberts & Owen 11 p Wallace and Perkins were represented by 
David Pierce of Fabian & Clendenin Insure-Rite Inc ("Insure-Rite") was leprcscntcd by John 
Martinez, Esq The Court having considered the legal memoranda in support of and in 
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opposition to the respective motions, oral argument on the same, and good cause appearing, 
hereby ORDERS ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. Based upon the file in this matter and the arguments set forth in Parkside's 
memoranda, Parkside's Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for Judgment on the Pleadings is 
granted and Insure-Rite's Counterclaim is dismissed vviih prejudice; 
2. Based upon the file in this matter and the arguments set forth in Wallace and 
Perkins' memoranda, Wallace and Perkins' Motion to Dismiss is granted and Insure-Rite's Third 
Party Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this I day of Qgteber, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
Stephen L. Henrio^^^rict^ourt Judgfe 
Approved As To Form: 
John Martinez 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
Insure-Rite, Inc. 
Approved As To Form: 
T^-JTS: 
John Robson 
David Pierce 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
Wallace & Associates and Collin Perkins 
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